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FOREWORD 
The Community Foundation for Ireland is proud to partner with the ESRI to produce 
this important piece of research that will help inform public debate and policy at a 
key time for communities. 
It is a partnership which fits with our role as a philanthropic foundation which has 
for 21 years worked with over 5,000 partner organisations on the ground to 
promote equality for all in thriving communities. 
This research comes at an important time for our country as we emerge from the 
Covid-19 pandemic, continue to respond to climate change and grapple with the 
future course for our island post-Brexit. Our response to each of these has the 
potential to impact on equality. 
The insights provided in this document and the development of harmonised 
indicators income growth, inequality, poverty and deprivation offer the 
opportunity to make informed decisions. 
As a foundation which for over 21 years has worked with donors to invest over 
€75 million into communities we believe it is particularly important that this report 
is not a stand-alone piece of work. 
Our partnership with the ESRI does not stop here. Follow up reports over the next 
two years will offer the opportunity to track change. They will also have the 
flexibility to deliver findings on emerging issues. We will be able to offer insight on 
how people, families and communities are being impacted over this important 
period. 
This will be particularly important in the area of young people. It is they who will 
be most impacted, making it all the more important that as a country we have 
research, evidence and facts to make informed choices and decisions. 
I want to also acknowledge the commitment of the Director of the ESRI Professor 
Alan Barrett and researchers Barra Roantree, Bertrand Maître, Alyvia McTague and 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
KEY FINDINGS 
This report is the first from a new ESRI research programme funded by The 
Community Foundation for Ireland which seeks to address gaps in our knowledge 
and understanding of poverty, income inequality and living standards in Ireland. It 
presents a new harmonised set of indicators derived from large-scale household 
surveys covering the period 1987 to 2019 that can be used by policymakers, 
academics and the wider public to inform discussions around these pressing issues 
and the appropriate policy response.  
 
The main findings of our research are as follows: 
 
Income growth and inequality 
• Average disposable incomes – after taxes, welfare payments and pensions – 
grew by around 3 per cent per year between 1987 and 2019 adjusting for 
inflation and changes in household composition. Despite a lost decade 
between 2007 and 2017 which disproportionately affected lower-income 
households, growth over the period as a whole was broad-based and 
progressive, stronger for those in the bottom half of the income distribution 
than the top. 
• As a result, measures of disposable income inequality have fallen substantially 
over time. In 2019, both the Gini coefficient and 90:10 ratio – two common 
such measures – stood at their lowest recorded levels in more than three 
decades. Other measures also tell a consistent story of declining inequality in 
disposable incomes, with any increases seen over the latter years of the Great 
Recession reversed by the recovery up to 2019. This experience differs to that 
of most other OECD countries, where increasing inequality has been the norm 
over a similar horizon (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson, 2015). 
• However, while growth in market incomes – before taxes, social welfare 
payments and pensions – has also been robust, this growth has been less 
broadly shared than that in disposable incomes. Declines in key measures of 
inequality of market income over the 1990s were reversed in the early 2000s 
with the Great Recession leading to a further rise. Although the recovery in the 
labour market since 2014 has meant that market income inequality had almost 
regained its pre-crisis level by 2019, this is likely to be undone by the sharp falls 
in employment wrought by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.  
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Income poverty and material deprivation  
• Over the full horizon our data cover, rates of income poverty and material 
deprivation – key indicators of low living standards – have also declined 
substantially across the population as a whole: by a quarter and by a half 
respectively between 1994 and 2019. 
• However, measures of income poverty and material deprivation both point to 
the consistently high incidence of low living standards among lone parents, 
their children, and those of working age in households without anyone in paid 
work. This pre-dates the Great Recession and has been an enduring feature of 
Irish society since at least the early 1990s.  
• Unlike in some other countries (e.g. Britain), the incidence of income poverty 
and material deprivation remains closely linked to the absence of anyone in 
paid work, both in single- and multi-adult households. This suggests that the 
social welfare system may provide a more targeted and effective tool for 
addressing low living standards than policies to increase low hourly wages. 
However, it should also give rise to concerns about the impact of COVID-19 
related job losses, particularly if those who have lost work are unable to return 
to their previous positions or find new ones for an extended period of time. 
 
Intergenerational inequality  
• Young adults have been disproportionately hit by job losses in 2020, in part as 
they were much more likely to work in sectors like hospitality, arts and leisure 
that were most exposed to the public health measures required to suppress 
the spread of the virus.  
• While concerning in and of itself, such patterns of job losses could compound 
the still lingering effects of the Great Recession, which left not in employment, 
education or training (NEET) rates for those age 20-24 almost a third higher on 
the eve of the pandemic than they were in 2007. This amounts to around 
30,000 more 20-24 year olds NEET than one would expect had the labour 
market fully recovered for this age group. 
• High and sustained levels of economic inactivity have been shown to have 
persistent negative effects on later life outcomes for young adults entering the 
labour market (von Wachter, 2020). We find early evidence consistent with 
(and suggestive of) such ‘scarring’ for those born in the 1990s whose average 
weekly earnings adjusted for inflation were no higher than those born in the 
1960s at age 20 to 22, and have by age 26 yet to surpass the average earnings 
of those born in the 1970s. 
• In addition to poorer prospects in the labour market, a growing share of young 
adults are facing high housing costs. This is largely as home ownership rates for 
young adults have collapsed – from over 60 per cent at age 30 for those born 
in the 1960s to less than 20 per cent for those born in the late 1980s – leaving 
them more exposed to rapidly rising rents, especially in urban areas. 
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• The combined effect of these developments is to cast a pall over the prospects 
of young adults and should be cause of serious concern for society at large. 
One area where policy can help is ensuring the provision of high-quality active 
labour market programmes with sufficient capacity to cater for the numbers 
that will need them in the years ahead. Policies that act to tackle the root 
causes of high rents will also disproportionately benefit those younger adults 
who otherwise risk being left behind. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
 
There are growing global concerns about stagnating material living standards and 
rising economic inequality, particularly in advanced economies. For example, the 
OECD (2019) has highlighted the ‘dismal’ income growth experienced by middle-
income households in some countries over the last 30 years, while both Atkinson 
(2015) and Piketty and Saez (2003) point to increasing levels of inequality in the 
US, the UK and France since the late 1970s. Similar concerns have been expressed 
by some in Ireland (e.g. Sweeney, 2019), while others have pointed to the potential 
for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic to exacerbate existing inequalities in areas 
including the labour market, education and health (Darmody et al., 2020). 
 
However, discussions around poverty, inequality, low living standards and the 
appropriate policy response in Ireland are inhibited by the availability of 
harmonised indicators over an extended period of time. Although the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) has – through the Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC) – collected comprehensive information on the living standards of households 
annually since 2003, these do not cover the period of rapid economic growth seen 
in Ireland over the 1990s. And while comparable surveys – the 1987 ESRI Survey of 
Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services (the 1987 Survey) and the 
Living in Ireland Survey (LIIS) – were conducted by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI) over these years, the indicators of poverty, income 
inequality and low living standards derived by researchers using these data (e.g. 
Callan et al., 1989; Nolan and Maître, 2000; Nolan, 2003) are not directly 
comparable with those produced subsequently.1 
 
Despite a rich existing literature,2 this lack of consistent data contributes to 
significant gaps in our knowledge and understanding of poverty, deprivation, 
income inequality and living standards in Ireland. This report aims to help address 
some of these gaps by providing a harmonised set of indicators that can be used 
by policymakers, academics and the wider public.3 These are derived from the 
three high-quality large-scale household surveys mentioned above, which are 




1  This is for reasons as varied as differences in the definitions of income, deprivation, inflation and equivalence scales 
used across studies, in addition to revisions to the weights used to make these data representative of the underlying 
populations they are designed to measure.  
2  See, for example, O’Connell (1982); Callan et al. (1988; 2018); Callan and Nolan (1997); Nolan et al. (2000; 2014); O’Neill 
and Sweetman (2001); Nolan (2009); and Roantree (2020b). 
3  A spreadsheet containing the data underlying the figures presented in this report is being published at 
https://doi.org/10.26504/bkmnext412_data, which we will update for the duration of this research programme. 
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construct the measures of poverty, deprivation, income inequality and living 
standards used in the report.  
 
The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 examines how incomes and 
income inequality have evolved in Ireland between 1987 and 2019: the earliest and 
most recent years of data currently available. It first examines growth in average 
incomes, before turning to look at differences in patterns of growth across the 
distribution and the implications of these patterns for income inequality. Given 
policymakers may have particular concerns about the living standards of those with 
least resources in society, Chapter 3 looks at two key indicators of low living 
standards: income poverty and material deprivation. 
 
In addition to these two chapters, which will be updated in future editions of this 
report, Chapter 4 examines another aspect of inequality which is receiving 
increasing attention in both the domestic and international policy debate: that of 
inequality between generations. This considers the disproportionate labour 
market impact of both the pandemic and Great Recession on young adults, in 
addition to recent developments in the housing market. These factors have 
combined to cast a pall over the prospects of young adults and should be cause of 
serious concern for society at large.  
 
The report concludes in Chapter 5 with a summary of our key findings and some 
reflections on their implications for policy.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Income growth and inequality 
 
This chapter explores how incomes and income inequality have evolved in Ireland 
between 1987 and 2019: the earliest and most recent years of data currently 
available. We first examine growth in average disposable incomes, that is after 
direct taxes have been paid and benefits received. Although subject to some 
important limitations,4 disposable incomes provide a useful measure of material 
living standards that are widely used by statistical agencies and researchers alike 
(e.g. Bourquin et al., 2020; Central Statistics Office, 2005; Callan et al., 1988). We 
then examine incomes before direct taxes are deducted, benefits received and 
pensions paid – so called ‘market income’ – before turning to look at differences in 
patterns of growth across the distribution and the implications of these patterns 
for income inequality.  
 
While the unit of analysis throughout this chapter is the individual, the measure of 
income we consider is that of the household adjusted for size and composition. We 
do this by taking the total income of all individuals living in a household, rescaling 
or ‘equivalising’ them to reflect the fact that households of different sizes and 
compositions have differing needs. The way in which we do this is consistent with 
the approach of Eurostat and Bourquin et al. (2020) among others but differs from 
that adopted by the CSO.5 As a result the results presented here are not directly 
comparable with those published annually by the CSO. All monetary amounts are 
converted to 2019 prices and all growth rates calculated after accounting for 
inflation using the CSO’s all-item Consumer Price Index.  
2.1 AVERAGE INCOMES 
Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of average (both mean and median) real equivalised 
disposable and market income across individuals over time. It shows that average 
real disposable incomes have grown strongly over the past three decades or so, 
increasing from €11,307 (€9,211) at the mean (median) in 1987 to €29,464 
(€25,406) in 2019. This corresponds to growth of 161 per cent at the mean and 
176 per cent at the median, annualised growth rates of 3.0 per cent and 3.2 per 




4  For example, there is evidence of under-reporting of incomes – especially among very high and low income households 
– in similar surveys internationally (Brewer et al., 2017; Bollinger et al., 2019; Meyer et al., 2015), while even those 
households for whom incomes are recorded with perfect accuracy, the measure is a ‘snapshot’ one that captures both 
temporary and permanent differences between individuals. 
5  We use the modified OECD scales which assign the first adult in a household a weight of 1, children under 14 a weight 
of 0.3 and any other individuals a weight of 0.5. The CSO uses scales of 1, 0.33 and 0.66 respectively. 
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FIGURE 2.1  AVERAGE REAL EQUIVALISED DISPOSABLE AND MARKET INCOME: 1987-2019  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland Survey 
and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Note: Expressed in 2019 prices in terms of equivalent amounts for a single adult living alone. 
 
However, disposable incomes have also been subject to significant volatility, with 
gains between 2003 and 2007 eliminated by declines seen over the course of the 
Great Recession. Indeed, while the subsequent recovery has been relatively rapid, 
it was not until 2017 that both mean and median disposable incomes had 
surpassed their pre-Great Recession peaks, amounting to a lost decade of income 
growth between 2007 and 2017 for the population as a whole. 
 
Average market incomes also saw substantial growth and volatility over this 
period.6 Figure 2.1 shows that this rose from €11,332 (€8,994) at the mean 
(median) in 1987 to €30,141 (€23,799) in 2019. This corresponds to growth of 
166 per cent at the mean and 165 per cent at the median, annualised average 
growth rates of 3.1 per cent. While average market income growth was therefore 
weaker than disposable income growth, it was also more volatile. Figure 2.1 shows 
that the fall from peak to trough over the Great Recession was far more substantial 
for market incomes, with declines of 22 per cent at the mean and 32 per cent at 
the median between 2007 and 2012 compared to 15 per cent and 14 per cent 
respectively for disposable income.  
 
This larger decline in average market income in part reflects the rapid increase in 
unemployment, which rose from 4.9 per cent in September 2007 to 16.1 per cent 




6  Our definition of market income excludes that from occupational and private pensions as these are not distinguishable 






















Disposable (median) Market (median) Disposable (mean) Market (mean)
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market income.7 However, it also reflects the stabilising effect of the tax and 
welfare system, which automatically cushions the fall in disposable income for 
households who lose work by reducing their direct tax liabilities and replacing 
some of their earnings with jobseeker’s payments. Dolls et al. (2012) estimate that 
these automatic stabilisers absorb an average of around two-fifths of a typical 
income shock in EU countries, with Ireland performing close to this average. 
However, changes in income on average can mask very different experiences at 
different levels of incomes. For this reason we now turn to look at income growth 
across the distribution.  
2.2 DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of income in 2019 and how this has changed from 
that in 1987. It divides the population into 100 equally sized groups (centiles) 
arranged from lowest- to highest income, left to right, and plots the average 
disposable income – again expressed as the equivalent amount for a single adult – 
for each of these groups as bars. Overlaid on this is a line showing the real change 
in disposable income at that point (centile) of the distribution since 1987. The 
figure shows that while income is unequally distributed – with 12 per cent 
reporting less than €15,000 per year and 3 per cent more than €60,000 per year in 
2019 – there has been progressive broad-based growth over this period as a whole, 
stronger at the bottom of the distribution than the middle or the top. 
 
FIGURE 2.2  DISTRIBUTION OF REAL EQUIVALISED DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD INCOME: 2019 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland Survey 
and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Notes: Incomes after direct taxes paid and benefits received, expressed in 2019 prices in terms of equivalent amounts for a single adult. 
Lowest- and highest two centiles are excluded given potential concerns about the reliability of data at these extremes (Bollinger 




























































Centile of real equivalised disposable income
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Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland 
Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Note: Incomes after direct taxes paid and benefits received, with growth rates calculated after accounting for inflation using the CSO’s 
all-item Consumer Price Index. 
 
Figure 2.3 plots the average annualised real growth rate across the distribution of 
income over different periods. The yellow series simply rescales the cumulative 
percentage change shown in Figure 2.2, with the subsequent series showing that 
this pattern of progressive broad-based growth has been a feature for most of the 
past three decades. The blue series shows that between 1987 and 1997 growth 
was highest at the very bottom of the distribution, while the green series shows 
that growth was higher for the bottom-half than the top-half of the distribution 
between 1997 and 2007.  
 
Similarly, the pink series shows that the recovery since 2012 has been strongest at 
the very bottom of the distribution, with growth for the lowest-income fifth (20 
centiles) stronger than the rest of the distribution. However, the orange series 
shows that the fall in incomes between 2007 and 2012 was also much more 
pronounced at the bottom of the distribution, with an average decline of more 
than 5 per cent per year over this period for the very lowest centiles compared to 
































Centile of real equivalised disposable income
1987-1997 1997-2007 2007-2012 2012-2019 1987-2019
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FIGURE 2.4 DISTRIBUTION OF REAL EQUIVALISED MARKET INCOME: 2019 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland 
Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Note: Incomes before direct taxes paid and benefits received, expressed in 2019 prices in terms of equivalent amounts for a single 
adult. Excludes pension income as that from occupational pension schemes cannot be distinguished from non-market sources, 
notable the State pension. Values below 0 – e.g. self-employment losses – are censored at 0.  
 
Figure 2.4 plots the distribution of market income in 2019, dividing the population 
into centiles arranged from lowest- to highest-income like in Figure 2.3 but with 
the bars now showing the average market income for each of these groups, again 
expressed in terms of the equivalent amount for a single adult. This shows that the 
market income is much more unequally distributed than disposable income with, 
for example, 36 per cent reporting less than €15,000 per year and 10 per cent more 
than €60,000 per year, compared to just 12 per cent and 3 per cent respectively 
for disposable income. 
 
What is particularly striking is that in 2019, 15 per cent of individuals lived in a 
household with no positive market income. While this includes individuals in 
retired households, Roantree (2020b) shows that – compared to other European 
countries – Ireland has a relatively high share of working-age adults living alone 
and lone parents who do not have income from employment. One consequence of 
this is that it is not possible to plot the growth rate in market income across the 
distribution (as in Figure 2.3 for disposable income) because this statistic is not 
defined over large swathes of the distribution. For this reason, we now turn to look 



























Centile of real equivalised market income
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2.3 INCOME INEQUALITY 
Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of some selected measures of disposable income 
inequality. While there were some short periods when these measures were rising, 
the overall trend is one of declining income inequality across the population. For 
example, on the eve of the pandemic in 2019 the Gini coefficient – which 
summarises the level of income inequality as a number between 0 (where 
everyone has the same income) and 1 (where one person has all income) – stood 
at 0.280: the lowest recorded value our data cover, 16 per cent below its 1987 level 
(0.333). Similarly, the ratio of the person at the 90th percentile of the distribution 
compared to the person at the 10th percentile of the distribution – the 90:10 ratio 
– has fallen by a fifth, from 4.0 in 1987 to 3.2 in 2019. Figure 2.5 also shows that 
the top 10 per cent share of income has fallen, from 25.9 per cent in 1987 to 
23.2 per cent in 2019. 
 
FIGURE 2.5  DISPOSABLE INCOME INEQUALITY: 1987-2019  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the 1987 ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland 
Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Note: Incomes after direct taxes paid and benefits received. 
 
The decline in disposable income inequality is also evident in other measures of 
income inequality. Appendix Table B.1 shows that alternate percentile ratios – the 
90:50, 75:25 and 50:10 – and supplementary summary measures of disposable 
income inequality all also exhibit declines over this period. Taken together, the 
evidence suggests a consistent story of declining income inequality across the 




































Gini (LHS) Top decile share (LHS) 90:10 ratio (RHS)
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FIGURE 2.6  MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY: 1987-2019 
 
 
Sources: Gini and top decile share by authors’ using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living 
in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. Top 1 per cent share as estimated by 
Nolan (2007; 2012; 2018) taken from World Inequality Database. 
Notes: Gini and top decile share are Incomes before direct taxes paid and benefits received, excluding pension income. Top 1 per cent 
share is of pre-tax national income.  
 
However, Figure 2.6 shows a different story for incomes measured before direct 
taxes are deducted, benefits received, and pensions paid. Although market income 
inequality fell over the late 1990s as measured by both the Gini coefficient and the 
top decile share, these declines were quickly reversed over the early 2000s.8 
Market income inequality then rose significantly over the Great Recession, with 
the Gini coefficient rising from 0.516 in 2007 to 0.595 by 2010 and the top decile 
share from 32.9 per cent to 37.6 per cent over the same period. This rise was 
closely related to the sharp increase in unemployment experienced over the Great 
Recession, as the steady decline in the Gini coefficient – and the less steady decline 
in the top decile share – since 2014 shows. Indeed, both these measures of market 
income inequality were on track to reach their pre-recession level on the eve of 
the pandemic, as was the unemployment rate for the population as a whole. 
 
An important caveat to these measures of income inequality relates to those at the 
very top of the distribution. As in other countries, there is evidence that household 
surveys in Ireland do a poor job of capturing the incomes of the top 1 per cent or 
so of households (Callan et al., 2020; Burkhauser et al., 2018; Ruiz and Woloszko, 




8  We do not show the 90:10 ratio in this figure as it cannot be computed when more than 10 per cent of individuals are 
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sampled by and respond to household surveys, or perhaps provide incomplete 
information on their incomes to those surveying them (Lustig, 2018).  
 
Statistics published from tax returns provide an alternative source for measures of 
top income inequality. Using such data from the Revenue Commissioners, Nolan 
(2007; 2012; 2018) estimates the top 1 per cent share of pre-tax national income 
which – with the caveat that it constitutes a very different concept to (equivalised 
household) market income – we also show in Figure 2.6.9 Intriguingly, this top 1 per 
cent share rose from 7.8 per cent in 1987 to 13.2 per cent in 2006, with the most 
rapid rise occurring when our measures of market income inequality were falling. 
Similarly, the top 1 per cent share fell sharply during the Great Recession when our 
measure of market income inequality was rising, then rose again from 2012 when 
measures of market income inequality were falling.  
 
This suggests a need for caution in drawing strong conclusions about the evolution 
of market income inequality at the very top of the distribution in Ireland. However, 
Figure 2.7 shows that percentile ratios calculated across those with positive market 
income tell the same story for the rest of the population as do the Gini and top 
decile share shown in Figure 2.6. These measures of market income inequality fell 
significantly over the 1990s, rose during the 2000s and Great Recession, then fell 
again during the recovery. Unsurprisingly, the share of individuals living in 
households without any positive market income also rose significantly over the 
course of the Great Recession – from 13 per cent in 2007 to 23 per cent in 2010 – 
and has fallen back to 15 per cent in 2019 with the economic recovery.  
 
Such trends illustrate the importance of changes in employment to the level and 
evolution of inequality in both market and disposable income, as has been found 
by previous research for Ireland. For example, Callan et al. (1998) show that 
increases in the labour force participation of married women were particularly 
important in explaining the decline in disposable income inequality between 1987 
and 1994, while Barrett et al. (1999) point to the significant decline in 





9  This is because tax returns are collected at the level of the tax unit rather than household, so do not adjust for size or 
composition in the same way. Callan et al. (2020) show that this is quantitatively important and accounts for around 
half of the difference in estimates of the top 10 per cent income share between SILC and Nolan (2018), with the 
remaining difference explained by the different income concepts used.  
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Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland 
Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files.  
Note: Percentile ratios for incomes before direct taxes paid and benefits received, excluding pension income and those without any 
such income.  
 
An implication of this is that the significant disruption to the labour market caused 
by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to lead to levels of market income inequality 
that will remain elevated until those who have lost work are able to return to their 
previous positions or find new ones. More ambiguous is the effect of these job 
losses on disposable income inequality. Simulations by Doorley et al. (2020) 
suggest that while market income inequality did indeed rise in 2020, the combined 
effect of the government’s initial policy response and measures announced in 
Budget 2021 were sufficient to more than offset this rise and leave disposable 
income inequality lower. How this evolves in the years ahead will therefore likely 
depend on the speed of the economic recovery, as well as the length of time 
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CHAPTER 3 
Income poverty and material deprivation 
 
Our focus so far has been on income growth and inequality across the entire 
population. However, policymakers may have particular concerns about the living 
standards of those with least resources. In this chapter we look at two key 
indicators of low living standards: income poverty and material deprivation.  
3.1 INCOME POVERTY 
Standard measures of income poverty conceptualise low living standards as not 
having sufficient resources to buy essential goods and services. However, what 
should be considered an essential good or service is a subjective question to which 
the answer will evolve over time, reflecting changes in average living standards, 
technology and the views of society more generally. Because of this, most 
measures of income poverty are ultimately relative and indeed are explicitly 
defined with respect to average incomes, setting a ‘poverty line’ under which 
individuals are deemed to be in or at risk of poverty if their incomes fall below.10  
 
Figure 3.1 presents estimates for three such measures of income poverty between 
1987 and 2019. The first – and most common – measure sets the poverty line at 
60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, while the second and third 
do so at 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.11 Figure 3.1 shows that under all 
three definitions the rate of income poverty rose over the 1990s: from 17.8 per 
cent in 1987 to 21.4 per cent in 1999 using the 60 per cent definition; from 8 per 
cent to 12.7 per cent using the 50 per cent definition; and from 4 per cent to 6 per 
cent (after falling in the early 1990s) using the 40 per cent definition. All three 
measures then declined substantially over the 2000s such that they had fallen 
below their 1987 level in 2010. Although the rate of income poverty fell in the initial 
years of the Great Recession on both the 50 per cent and 60 per cent measures 
(reflecting the combined effect of falling median incomes and continued increases 
to social welfare payments), all three measures rose between 2010 and 2012 as 
the impact of reductions to social welfare payments for working-age recipients was 




10  This is true even for what are sometimes (confusingly) called measures of ‘absolute poverty’. These define the poverty 
line in relation to average incomes in some fixed year, in contrast to what are sometimes called measures of ‘relative 
poverty’ that do so in relation to contemporary average incomes. We restrict attention to the latter class of measures 
as our focus in this section is changes in poverty over the medium to long run. 
11  The definition of equivalised disposable income used is the same as in Chapter 2, which uses modified OECD 
equivalence scales to adjust for household size and composition. This means that the statistics presented here are not 
directly comparable to those released by the CSO, which use a different set of equivalence scales.  
14 | Pov erty , income inequality and living standards in Ireland 
FIGURE 3.1  AT RISK OF POVERTY RATE, VARIOUS THRESHOLDS: 1987-2019 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland 
Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Incomes after direct taxes paid and benefits received, adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD 
equivalence scales. 
 
Since 2012, income poverty has fallen on all three measures with the pace 
accelerating from 2017 as full employment returned and increases to social welfare 
payments for working-age recipients resumed (Savage et al., 2016). Indeed, this 
decline left income poverty at its lowest rate recorded in the 30 plus years our data 
cover, on all three measures.  
 
However, the rate of income poverty for the entire population can mask significant 
variation across the population. We now turn to look at the experience of different 
groups using the 60 per cent of disposable income measure, which – in the 
interests of brevity – we henceforth refer to as the at risk of poverty rate. We also 
restrict our attention to the years 1994 to 2019 because of the more limited 
demographic variables available in the 1987 ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, 
Poverty and Usage of State Services that is the source for our analysis.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows that the at risk of poverty rate has declined steadily for children, 
from 27 per cent in 1994 to 14 per cent in 2019, while that for working-age adults 
fluctuated around 15 per cent from 1994 to 2017 before declining to 11 per cent 
in 2019. By contrast, at risk of poverty rates for those age 65+ rose sharply over the 
late 1990s before falling back over the 2000s to such an extent that those age 65+ 




12  Those 65+ remain the age group at lowest risk of poverty using the CSO’s national equivalence scale, which implies a 
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FIGURE 3.2  AT RISK OF POVERTY RATE, BY AGE GROUP: 1994-2019 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, that is after direct taxes paid and benefits received 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence scales. 
 
These developments are closely related to changes in the maximum rate of the 
State pension over time. Between 1995 and 1999, when the at risk of poverty rate 
was rising sharply for those age 65+, this increased by just 14 per cent in real terms 
compared to real growth of 35 per cent in median disposable income. By contrast, 
the maximum rate of the State pension grew by 50 per cent in real terms over the 
2000s, much faster than median disposable income growth of 28 per cent and 
coinciding with a period of rapidly declining at risk of poverty rates for those age 
65+. Since 2009, growth in the maximum rate of the State pension has again lagged 
behind that of average incomes – increasing by 5 per cent to 2019 compared to 9 
per cent for real median disposable income – with the at risk of poverty rate for 
those 65+ again rising: from 9.8 per cent in 2010 to 17.4 per cent in 2018. This 
illustrates the crucial role the State pension plays in determining the living 
standards of the older population.  
 
However, there also exists significant variation in income poverty among those age 
65+. Figure 3.3 shows that although the at risk of poverty rate is low and has 
continued falling for those age 65+ who live with at least one other adult, it has 
increased significantly for those living alone since 2010: from 12.4 per cent to 
40.2 per cent in 2019. Nolan et al. (2019) show that much of this elevated risk of 
poverty is explained by weak previous attachment to the labour market and 
periods of emigration, as well as by persons not claiming their full entitlements to 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, that is after direct taxes paid and benefits received 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence scales. 
 
Those age 65+ living alone faced even higher at risk of poverty rates in the 1990s, 
reaching almost 80 per cent in 1999 before falling dramatically during the 2000s. 
This was again primarily due to changes in the State pension, which is a particularly 
important source of income for this group. We observe similarly sharp falls in the 
at risk of poverty rate using alternative thresholds. 
 
There is also significant variation in income poverty among children and those of 
working age. Figure 3.4 shows that while much lower than it was in 1994, the at 
risk of poverty rate is substantially higher for children or working-age adults living 
in single adult households than for those living in a household with at least two 
adults. Indeed in 2019 the at risk of poverty rate among those living in single adult 
households was – at around 30 per cent – more than double that of those living in 
a two or three+ adult household with children (10.7 per cent and 12.3 per cent 
respectively) and more than three times that of those living in a two or three+ adult 
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FIGURE 3.4  AT RISK OF POVERTY RATE FOR THOSE AGED <65, BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE: 1994-2019 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, that is after direct taxes paid and benefits received 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence scales. 
 
Income poverty is also closely related to the presence of a paid worker in the 
household. Figure 3.5 shows that over the entire period our data cover, the at risk 
of poverty rate is much lower among those in households where there is at least 
one person in paid work than those where there is none. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by the fact that the at risk of poverty rate for those in households with 
no adult in paid work fell below 30 per cent in one year (2007), while the rate for 
those in households with at least one person in paid work has never exceeded 
20 per cent, for the most part fluctuating around or below 10 per cent. The recent 
rise in the at risk of poverty rate among those in households without anyone in 
paid work is also striking, increasing – for example – from 28.4 per cent in 2007 to 
47 per cent in 2019 for those in two adult households and from 50.2 per cent in 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, that is after direct taxes paid and benefits received 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence scales. 
 
These changes in at risk of poverty rates over time have – alongside shifting 
demographics – left the composition of those below the at risk of poverty line in 
2019 very different to what it was in 1994. Figure 3.6 plots the number of people 
below this poverty line by household type along with the share of the total number 
at risk of poverty that they comprise for each of those years. It shows that the share 
living in single adult households (the first three sets of bars) has increased 
substantially, from 24 per cent in 1994 to 40 per cent in 2019. This means that 
despite a decline in the overall at risk of poverty rate during this period (from 
19.1 per cent to 12.8 per cent as shown in Figure 3.1), the number below the 
poverty line living in single adult households has increased from 160,000 in 1994 
to 253,000 in 2019.  
 
At the same time, there has been a substantial reduction in the number of people 
below the poverty line living in 2+ adult households, down from 516,000 people in 
1994 to 378,000 in 2019. This decline has been particularly pronounced among 
those age 0-64 living in 2+ adult households where no one is in paid work, which 
fell from representing 42 per cent of those below the poverty line to 29 per cent 
over this period. However, despite the much lower at risk of poverty rates they 
face (shown in Figure 3.5), those in 2+ adult households continue to comprise the 
majority of those below the poverty line, largely as they continue make up the vast 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, that is after direct taxes paid and benefits received 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence scales. 
 
Figure 3.6 also shows that the share of those below the poverty line living in a 
household with someone in paid work is almost the same in 2019 (at 34 per cent 
or 221,000 people) as it was in 1994 (at 33 per cent or 216,000 people). This is in 
contrast to some other countries, like Britain, where the share of those below the 
poverty line living in a household where no one is in paid work has risen from 37 
per cent to 58 per cent over the same period (Bourquin et al., 2019). 
 
Poverty is a complex phenomenon, and no single measure or indicator can hope to 
fully capture its extent. While the at risk of poverty rate is widely used for 
monitoring poverty, Whelan et al. (2019, p684) – among others – argue that its 
limitations include:  
the failure to take account of longer-term command over resources, 
unusually high expenses, accumulated debt, the distinctive circumstances 
of the self-employed and the role played by state services.  
 
In part because of these limitations, researchers working in the area of poverty and 
social exclusion have moved towards using multiple measures including non-
monetary indicators. We now turn to look at one such measure of low living 
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3.2 MATERIAL DEPRIVATION 
Like income poverty, measures of material deprivation also conceptualise low 
living standards as not having sufficient resources to buy essential goods and 
services. However, they take a different approach to assessing this than measures 
of income poverty, directly asking people whether they are able to afford certain 
items which might be considered essential. We construct an indicator of material 
deprivation that can be measured across the years covered by the Living in Ireland 
Survey (LIIS) and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) – 1994 to 2019 
– which classifies people as being materially deprived if they are unable to afford 
two or more of the following ten items:13 
• Two pairs of strong shoes; 
• A warm waterproof overcoat; 
• New (not second-hand) clothes; 
• Replacement of worn out furniture; 
• A meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; 
• A roast joint or its equivalent once a week; 
• Home heating during the last year; 
• Presents for family or friends at least once a year; 
• Drinks or a meal for family or friends once a month; 
• A morning, afternoon or evening of entertainment once a fortnight. 
 
Figure 3.7 plots this measure of material deprivation alongside the at risk of 
poverty rate for the period 1994 to 2019. This shows that the two measures differ 
in some important respects with, for example, the rate of deprivation falling over 
the 1990s when the at risk of poverty rate was increasing, and rising in the initial 
years of the Great Recession when the at risk of poverty rate was falling. The 
deprivation rate has also exhibited more volatility than the at risk of poverty rate 
during the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery, rising from 16.4 per cent 
to 28.5 per cent between 2009 and 2014 compared to from 14.6 per cent to 
16.6 per cent. This is in part because the at risk of poverty rate can be sensitive to 
changes in average incomes, given it is determined with reference to 




13  Not all 11 items used for the current official definition of consistent poverty used in the national anti-poverty targets 
are available for the full period. Section A.3 in Appendix A provides an overview of changes in the measurement of 
material deprivation in Ireland and how this indicator differs from that used by the Department of Employment Affairs 
and Social Protection (DEASP) (2020), published by the CSO in its annual Survey of Income and Living Conditions release 
and that used in the contemporary analysis of the Living in Ireland Survey (e.g. Nolan and Whelan, 1996).  
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FIGURE 3.7 DEPRIVATION AND POVERTY RATES OVER TIME  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Poverty line defined as 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income, that is after direct taxes paid and benefits received 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence scales. Deprivation defined as being unable to 
afford two or more items from a list of ten essentials. 
 
 
For example, Figure 2.1 showed that real median household income fell 
substantially between 2009 and 2012 meaning that the threshold below which one 
would be considered at risk of poverty also fell substantially. This illustrates the 
difficulty that the at risk of poverty rate can have in measuring low living standards 
in period of profound economic change such as the Great Recession.  
 
As with poverty, rates of deprivation vary considerably across age groups. 
Figure 3.8 shows that children have consistently experienced the highest rates of 
deprivation and – with the exception of two years – those age 65+ the lowest. 
Unlike the poverty rate (which was rising for those age 65+ in the late 1990s), all 
age groups experienced a strong fall in deprivation between 1994 and 2007. The 
deprivation rate also rose rapidly during the Great Recession for all age groups, 
though this was much more pronounced for children and those of working age, 
rising to 35 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. While the economic recovery 
since 2014 has seen deprivation rates for all age groups fall back towards their 
pre-recession levels, the series all rose in the most recent year of data. Whether – 
given rising median incomes, falling income inequality and poverty rates – this is a 
statistical anomaly remains to be seen, but it represents a concerning development 
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FIGURE 3.8  DEPRIVATION RATE BY AGE GROUP 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Deprivation defined as being unable to afford two or more items from a list of ten essentials. 
 
Given these figures suggest that – unlike with income poverty – children have been 
consistently at significantly higher risk of material deprivation than the rest of the 
population, we now turn to look in more depth at which children are living in 
deprived households. This means that the groups we examine differ somewhat 
from those considered in relation to income poverty above.  
 
Research has long suggested that one of the most protective factors against 
poverty is whether working age adults are in employment (e.g. OECD, 2008; 2009) 
as well as the number of people at work within households (Watson et al., 2012). 
It is not surprising, then, that Figure 3.9 shows that there is a strong relationship 
between the number of paid workers in the household and child deprivation. In all 
but one year our data cover, the deprivation rate for children living in households 
without anyone in paid work has exceeded 50 per cent, while that for children in 
households with at least one person in paid work has never reached this level. In 
addition, although deprivation rates for children in households with someone in 
work have fallen substantially during the recent recovery, this is not the case for 
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FIGURE 3.9 DEPRIVATION RATE FOR CHILDREN, BY NUMBER OF PAID WORKERS IN HOUSEHOLD  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Deprivation defined as being unable to afford two or more items from a list of ten essentials. 
 
Figure 3.10 shows that while there are almost no differences in the rate of material 
deprivation between children in families with two adults and the overall 
population, rates are slightly higher for those with three or more adults. However, 
child deprivation rates are much higher for children in one adult households. 
Despite a significant decline over the late 1990s and during the more recent 
recovery, the rate of deprivation for children in one adult households has stood 
above 40 per cent in all but three of the years our data cover, and more than 50 per 
cent for the majority of those years.14 
 
Given the high rates of deprivation among children in single adult households, it is 
of little surprise then that Figure 3.11 shows lone parents are also at greater risk of 
deprivation than other working-age adults. However, the deprivation rate is 
slightly lower than for children in lone-parent households, implying that lone-
parents experiencing deprivation have – on average – more children than lone-
parents not experiencing deprivation. The figure also shows that those in multi-
adult households without children have the lowest deprivation rates of working-
age adults, substantially below that for single adults living alone and – for the most 
part – those with children. Interestingly, single adults have experienced 
consistently higher rates of deprivation than working age adults in two adult 




14  The substantial decline in the deprivation rate for children in single adult households between 1998 and 1999 should 
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FIGURE 3.10 DEPRIVATION RATE FOR CHILDREN, BY NUMBER OF ADULTS IN HOUSEHOLD  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 




FIGURE 3.11 DEPRIVATION RATE FOR WORKING-AGE ADULTS, BY HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
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FIGURE 3.12 DEPRIVATION RATE FOR WORKING-AGE ADULTS, BY NUMBER IN PAID WORK  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Deprivation defined as being unable to afford two or more items from a list of ten essentials. 
 
We now look at the relationship between the number of paid workers for working-
age adults and their deprivation levels. Figure 3.12 mirrors the results found for 
children in Figure 3.9, showing that deprivation rates decline with the number of 
paid workers in the household. Working-age adults in household without any paid 
workers experience very high deprivation rates, exceeding 40 per cent in most of 
the years covered by our data. Levels of deprivation are much lower for working-
age adults living in households with someone in paid work, especially those in 
households with two or more in paid work. These findings again illustrate how paid 
work and the intensity of paid work in households is a protective factor against 
poverty and deprivation. However, it is also notable that while working-age adults 
living in households with one paid worker faced average or below average 
deprivation rates before the Great Recession, they have faced slightly higher rates 
of deprivation since. 
 
In Figure 3.8 we showed that people aged 65 and over were – compared to other 
age groups – less likely to experience deprivation and that even during the 
recession they always reported the lowest deprivation rates. However, we have 
also seen that there is significant variation in the experience of deprivation among 
children and working-age adults depending on the structure of the household they 
live in. Similarly, Figure 3.13 shows that people aged 65 and over living with others 
have experienced rates of deprivation that are well below those experienced by 
the general population. In contrast, those age 65+ living alone have – on average – 
deprivation rates 1.6 times greater than their counterparts living with others, 
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FIGURE 3.13 DEPRIVATION RATE FOR THOSE AGE 65+, BY WHETHER LIVE ALONE OR NOT 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Deprivation defined as being unable to afford two or more items from a list of ten essentials. 
 
However, while we have seen that those age 65+ living alone were at substantially 
greater risk of poverty than the general population, this is not the case for 
deprivation. Indeed, even though they have consistently faced higher rates of 
deprivation than their counterparts living with at least one other person, those age 
65+ living alone have experienced lower rates of deprivation than the general 
population. This may be because the same level of income in retirement is not 
needed to obtain a given standard of living in working life as many retirees do not 
face costs associated with work (for example, commuting costs) or housing (having 
no mortgage outstanding) and have more leisure time, some of which Aguiar and 
Hurst (2005) show is used to achieve desired consumption at a lower cost (e.g. 
shopping around for lower-cost groceries or cooking from scratch rather than 
eating prepared meals).  
 
It is also notable that while the deprivation rate rose rapidly for the overall 
population over the course of the Great Recession, the rise was much less 
pronounced for those age 65+. This was likely driven by the protection of the State 
pension over the course of the Great Recession, in contrast to social welfare 
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FIGURE 3.14 COMPOSITION OF THOSE LIVING IN MATERIAL DEPRIVATION, BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Living in Ireland Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions RMF. 
Note: Deprivation defined as being unable to afford two or more items from a list of ten essentials. 
 
As with income poverty, changes in deprivation rates over time have – alongside 
shifting demographics – left the composition of those living in material deprivation 
quite different from that in 1994. The first two blue bars in Figure 3.14 show that 
while just 9.4 per cent of the population experiencing deprivation were 
0-64 year olds living in single adult households in 1994, this had more than doubled 
to 19.3 per cent by 2019: an estimated increase of almost 92,000 people. At the 
same time, there has been a decline in the share of the population experiencing 
deprivation who are age 0-64 and living in a multi-adult household: down from a 
combined 81.7 per cent in 1994 to 71.7 per cent in 2019 (reflecting the fact that 
such households also make up the bulk of the population). Figure 3.14 shows that 
the composition of those 65+ experiencing deprivation has also shifted towards 
those living in single adult households: rising from 3.3 per cent of the total in 1994 
to 4.1 per cent in 2019.   
3.3 INTEGRATING RESULTS ON INCOME POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION  
How do we integrate the results from the two measures of low living standards 
that we have considered in this chapter? While both show a decline over the full 
horizon our data cover (with the overall prevalence of income poverty and 
deprivation falling from 25 per cent to 18 per cent and from 19 per cent to 13 per 
cent respectively between 1994 and 2019), we have seen that the increase in the 
overall at risk of poverty rate was much more muted over the course of the Great 
Recession than that in the deprivation rate. In addition, each measure suggests 
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in the case of material deprivation and those aged 65+ living alone in the case of 
income poverty. 
 
While both measures are informative in their own right, an alternative approach is 
to measure the combined incidence of income poverty and material deprivation. 
This was the approach designed by researchers from the ESRI (Callan et al., 1993, 
Nolan and Whelan, 1996) and adopted by the Government of Ireland in their 1997 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy, which for the first time framed a poverty reduction 
target based on such a measure, termed ‘consistent poverty’. This measure has 
continued to be used to set national poverty and social exclusion targets in Ireland 
(DEASP, 2020), but also as part of the Irish contribution to the Europe 2020 poverty 
strategy (European Commission, 2010). While such a measure has many 
advantages, it also – by definition – excludes some individuals experiencing only 
one form of low living standards and suggests a much lower prevalence of low 
living standards than either income poverty or material deprivation.15 
 
However, measures of income poverty and material deprivation both point to the 
high incidence of low living standards among certain groups. We have seen that 
this is the case for lone parents and their children as well as those of working-age 
adults living in households without anyone in paid work, with high rates of income 
poverty and material deprivation for both groups an enduring feature of Irish 
society since at least the early 1990s. Indeed, measures of consistent poverty also 
point to these groups as having experienced a higher incidence of low living 
standards than others.16  
 
In summary, while measures of income poverty and material deprivation have 
evolved differently across the economic cycle and differ somewhat in the groups 
they highlight as being at particular risk, both tell a consistent story about the 
overall direction of travel and the greater incidence of low living standards among 
certain groups: lone parents, their children and working-age adults living in 




15  For example, the CSO estimates (using somewhat different definitions to those deployed here) that the rates of income 
poverty and material deprivation across the population as a whole were 12.8 per cent and 17.8 per cent respectively 
in 2019, but that the rate of consistent poverty was just 5.5 per cent: see Table SIA12 at https://data.cso.ie/table/SIA12. 
A consequence of this lower prevalence is that we cannot compute rates of consistent poverty for many groups in a 
manner compliant with the statistical disclosure rules currently applied by the CSO, one of the reasons we do not 
consider such measures in this report.  
16  See CSO Tables SIA49 and SIA17 available at https://data.cso.ie/product/SILC. 




This chapter explores an aspect of inequality which is receiving increasing attention 
in both the domestic and international policy debate: intergenerational inequality, 
that is of inequality between generations.18 Such inequalities have come into sharp 
focus since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with research highlighting the 
disproportionate impact in the labour market on younger workers and those from 
minority backgrounds (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020; Crossley et al., 2021; Enright et 
al., 2020). 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that job losses have also fallen most heavily on younger workers 
in Ireland. The series plot the change in the employment rate for different age 
groups over 2020, excluding those absent from paid work because of COVID-19.19 
These show employment rates fell by almost 60 per cent and 50 per cent 
respectively for those age 15-19 and 20-24 respectively in the second quarter of 
2020, compared to 25 per cent for those aged 25-29 and 55+, and 20 per cent for 
other age groups.  
 
FIGURE 4.1  CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT RATE FROM PEAK (Q1 2020=100) 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Labour Force Survey Research Microdata Files (LFS RMF). 




17  https://doi.org/10.26504/bkmnext412_chapter4. 
18  See, for example, Nugent (2020); Cribb (2019); Kurz et al. (2019); Resolution Foundation (2018). The term is sometimes 
also used to refer to the transmission of disadvantage within families, or social mobility.  
19  This differs from the definition of employment used by the CSO which includes those who expect to return to their 
employer in the next three months or receive more than 50 per cent of their previous salary, creating clear problems 
for the measurement of employment during a pandemic. Roantree (2020a) shows the same pattern holds examining 
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Although employment for all age groups recovered significantly in the latter half of 
2020 – reflecting the lifting of public health restrictions over the summer and 
around Christmas – younger workers have remained most adversely affected, 
especially taking into account the fact that seasonal patterns of work typically lead 
to higher rates of employment for younger workers over the summer and at 
Christmas. Indeed, employment remained a third below its pre-pandemic level for 
those age 15-19, a fifth below for those age 20-24, and 10 per cent below for those 
age 25-29, compared to 7 per cent for older age groups. As a result, there were an 
estimated 112,000 fewer 15-34 year olds in paid work in the final quarter of 2020 
than a year earlier, compared to 93,000 fewer workers aged 35+. 
 
This disproportionate impact of job losses on young workers is in part because they 
are more likely to work in retail, hospitality, arts or leisure: sectors which have been 
most heavily affected by the public health measures necessary to suppress the 
spread of COVID-19 (Byrne et al., 2020). This is shown in Figure 4.2, which plots the 
share of workers in these sectors by age and birth cohort. A sharp age gradient in 
the likelihood of working in such vulnerable sectors is evident, with fewer than a 
fifth of workers age 40-60 doing so compared to more than a third of those in their 
early 20s. Figure 4.2 also shows that – like in the UK (Blundell et al., 2020) – the 
importance of these sectors for young adults has been growing across generations, 
with almost 40 per cent of workers born between 1985 and 1994 working in retail, 
hospitality, arts or leisure in their mid-20s compared to around 20 per cent of those 
born in the 1970s.  
 




Sources: Authors’ calculations using Labour Force Survey Research Microdata Files (LFS RMF). 
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FIGURE 4.3  CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT RATE FROM PEAK (Q3 2007=100) 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Labour Force Survey Research Microdata Files (LFS RMF). 
Note: Employment rate calculated using ILO definition. 
 
In addition to being more likely to work in these lockdown susceptible sectors, 
Redmond and McGuinness (2020) show that young workers are significantly less 
likely to have previously worked from home conditional on their occupation. This 
suggests their scope for working from home may be more limited than older 
workers in the same jobs, a factor which could also help explain the greater decline 
in employment among younger adults shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Young adults were also disproportionately affected by job losses over the course 
of the Great Recession. This is shown in Figure 4.3, which (like Figure 4.1) plots the 
change in employment rates by age relative to their pre-crisis peak (in this case 
Q3 2007). Employment rates declined by around two-thirds from peak to trough 
for those age 16-19, a third for those age 20-25 and a fifth for those age 25-29, 
compared to around 10 per cent for older workers. Moreover, Figure 4.3 also 
shows that employment rates were only just approaching their pre-crisis level for 
25-29 year olds on the eve of the pandemic and were still far below the rates for 
those under 25, despite having recovered for other age groups by 2017 at the 
latest.  
 
Declines in employment for young adults need not have negative consequences if 
they are the result of a switch from employment to increased educational 
participation. Indeed, Bercholz and FitzGerald (2016) raise the prospect of a future 
boost to productivity and earnings arising from the fall in employment and rise in 
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FIGURE 4.4  NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION OR TRAINING (NEET) RATE 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Labour Force Survey Research Microdata Files (LFS RMF). 
Note: Not in paid work during the LFS reference week nor a student or apprentice in regular formal education during the last four weeks 
(excluding those temporarily on holidays). 
 
However, Figure 4.4 – which plots the ‘not in employment, education or training’ 
(NEET) rate for the youngest four age groups considered above – suggests a less 
sanguine development. It shows that while the NEET rate among those age 15-19 
was only temporarily elevated (and indeed by 2017 had recovered to a lower level 
than in 2007, indicating some substitution from employment to education), this 
was not the case for those in their 20s. Rather, the NEET rate for those aged 25-29 
doubled from 14 per cent in 2007 to 28 per cent in 2011 and had only just returned 
to its pre-crisis level on the eve of the pandemic. For those age 20-24 NEET rates 
rose even more sharply, from 10 per cent in 2007 to 26 per cent in 2011, and 
remained stubbornly above its pre-crisis rate at 13 per cent on the eve of the 
pandemic. This amounts to around 30,000 more 20-24 year olds not in education, 
employment or training than one would expect had the labour market fully 
recovered for this age group; a figure which would likely be higher still if it were 
not for the impact of emigration which Conefrey (2013) shows was 
disproportionately comprised of young adults over this period.  
 
Such high and sustained levels of economic inactivity should be of concern to 
policymakers, not just for the cost they represent in terms of un(der)utilised labour 
but also the potential ‘scarring’ effect they may have on young adults entering the 
labour market. A growing body of economic research finds entering a depressed 
labour market has large, negative impacts on earnings and employment that can 




20  See, for example, Burgess et al. (2003); Kahn (2010); Oreopoulous et al. (2012); Altonji et al. (2016); Schwandt and von 
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found to have persistent effects on the likelihood of engaging in criminal activities, 
experiencing divorce and even on support for redistribution.21 
 
FIGURE 4.5  AVERAGE REAL WEEKLY EARNINGS, BY AGE AND BIRTH COHORT 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services; the Living in Ireland survey; 
and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions. 
Note: Average (mean) real weekly earnings by age and year of birth cohort for those in paid work, deflated by the CPI. 
 
Figure 4.5 presents early evidence consistent with (and indeed suggestive of) the 
Great Recession having had such ‘scarring’ effects on the earnings of young adults 
in Ireland.22 It shows strikingly that – adjusted for inflation – average weekly 
earnings for workers born in the 1990s were no higher than for those born in the 
1960s at ages 20 to 22, and had by age 26 yet to surpass that of either the 1970s 
or 1980s cohort. This amounts to a halt in the patterns of earnings growth that 
have historically been observed across generations both in Ireland (as shown 
above) and internationally (e.g. Cribb, 2019; Kurz et al., 2019).  
 
However, Figure 4.5 also shows that a more widespread stagnation in earnings 
growth has ensued from the Great Recession, with average earnings for those born 
in the 1980s no higher from age 25 to 35 than for those born in the 1970s. This is 
despite those born in the 1980s seeing earnings that were on average substantially 
higher at the beginning of working life than they were for those born a decade 
earlier, and the earnings of the 1970s cohort also being affected by the Great 
Recession in their mid- to late-thirties. Indeed, those born in the 1980s and 1990s 




21  See Bell et al. (2018), Schwandt and von Wachter (2020) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) respectively. 
22  We say suggestive as credible causal identification of such scarring effects requires the exploitation of quasi-
experimental variation in economic circumstances using longitudinal or large-scale cross-sectional data on earnings 
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experience consistently higher earnings than that born a decade earlier, with 
average earnings for those born in the 1970s and 1960s falling below that of 
previous cohort at only one age apiece (45 and 55 respectively). Similar stagnation 
in earnings growth across generations has also been documented in Britain by 
Cribb (2019) and in the United States by Kurz et al. (2019). 
 
In addition to poor prospects in labour market, a growing share of young adults are 
facing high housing costs.23 Figure 4.6 illustrates this, plotting the share paying 
more than 30 per cent of their disposable income in housing costs – a metric of 
housing affordability proposed by Corrigan et al. (2019) – each month by age and 
birth cohort. This shows that more than a fifth of those born in the 1980s were 
paying more than 30 per cent of their disposable income on housing at age 30 
compared to 13 per cent of those born in the 1970s. While our data do not extend 
back far enough to cover previous generations at age 30, less than 10 per cent of 
those born in the 1960s spent more than 30 per cent of their disposable income 
on housing around age 40, compared to 13 per cent of those born in the 1970s.  
 




Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Survey of Income and Living Conditions. 
Note: Housing costs include rental payments for tenants and mortgage interest payments for owner-occupiers (gross of housing benefits 
and net of tax relief respectively) along with the cost of utilities, structural insurance, taxes on dwellings, regular maintenance and 





23  We use the Eurostat definition of housing costs from SILC which includes rental payments for tenants and mortgage 
interest payments for owner-occupiers (gross of housing benefits and net of tax relief respectively) along with the cost 
of utilities, structural insurance, taxes on dwellings, regular maintenance and repairs payments and mandatory services 
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FIGURE 4.7  SHARE OF EACH BIRTH COHORT THAT OWNS THEIR OWN HOME, BY AGE 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services; the Living in Ireland survey; and 
the Survey of Income and Living Conditions. 
Note: Home ownership defined as being the head – or the partner of the head – of a household that lives in an owner-occupied dwelling 
(i.e. adult children of owner-occupiers not counted as owning their own home).  
 
This change is closely related to a sharp decline in home ownership rates among 
recent generations, as is shown by Figure 4.7. While more than 60 per cent of those 
born in the 1960s lived in a home they or their partner owned by age 30, this had 
fallen to 39 per cent for those born in the 1970s and 32 per cent for those born in 
the early 1980s. While there may be some degree of catch-up at later ages (in part 
reflecting changes in patterns of family formation), the figure shows that rates of 
home ownership have tended to level off by age 45 for previous cohorts, with each 
successive generation less likely to live in owner-occupied housing than the last.  
 
Although tenure-neutral housing affordability has been a longstanding objective of 
(officially stated) Irish policy, research has consistently found that affordability 
issues are most acute in the private rented sector (e.g. Blackwell, 1989; Fahey, 
2004; Fahey et al., 2004; Corrigan et al., 2019; O’Toole et al., 2020). A consequence 
of declining rates of home ownership across generations is therefore that 
increasing numbers of young adults are exposed to the private rental market, 
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FIGURE 4.8  PRIVATE RENTS, BY TIME AND REGION 
 
 
Source: Residential Tenancies Board (2020). 
Note: Figure shows ESRI-RTB Rent Index of standardised rents. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.8, which plots changes in the Residential Tenancies 
Board (RTB) Rent Index since it began for four regions relative to their level in 
Q4 2007. While rents declined significantly over the course of the Great Recession, 
they have since regained and far surpassed their pre-crisis peak in all areas of the 
country. Rents have risen most sharply in Dublin, where they now stand 35 per 
cent above their Q4 2007 level and 85 per cent above their Q1 2011 trough. Other 
parts of the country have also seen significant increases in rent, with the indices 
for areas outside of Dublin all more than 20 per cent above their Q4 2007 level. 
 
The combined effect of these developments is to cast a pall over the prospects of 
young adults and should be a cause of serious concern for society at large. While 
we have looked only at widening inequalities across generations in housing and the 
labour market, Cribb (2019) and Kurz et al. (2019) show these are even more 
pronounced for wealth in Britain and the United States respectively. While 
bequests are likely to mitigate some of this inequality in wealth across generations 
(with those born in the 1980s and 1990s receiving inheritances from their parents 
born in the 1950s and 1960s), Bourquin et al. (2021) show these are also likely to 
amplify inequality within generations (between those with richer and those with 
poorer parents). 
 
As we discuss in the next chapter, one area where policy can help is ensuring the 
provision of high-quality active labour market programmes with sufficient capacity 
to cater for the numbers that will need them in the aftermath of the COVID-19 
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disproportionately benefit those younger adults who risk otherwise being left 
behind, especially those policies that act to increase the supply of housing. 
However, increasing housing supply significantly will take time and there may 
therefore be a case in the interim for examining whether the current of system of 
housing supports for low-income private renters (e.g. Housing Assistance Payment 
and Rent Supplement) is adequate. 





This report is the first from a new research programme funded by The Community 
Foundation for Ireland aimed at helping to address gaps in our knowledge and 
understanding of poverty, income inequality and living standards in Ireland. We 
conclude by summarising some of the key findings from our research and reflect 
on their implications for policy. 
 
Chapter 2 showed that Ireland has experienced strong if volatile growth in 
disposable incomes over the last three decades, which was broad-based and 
reduced income inequality significantly. While the magnitude of the growth might 
best be viewed as belated convergence with the rest of Europe – an Irish hare 
catching up with European tortoises, as described by Honohan and Walsh (2002) – 
it is not pre-ordained that such catch-up growth be broad-based or inclusive. From 
this point of view Ireland’s experience is notable. Indeed, as Thewissen et al. (2018) 
show, the decline in disposable income inequality experienced in Ireland over the 
last three decades is in striking contrast to the experience of most OECD countries 
over a similar horizon.24 While Callan et al. (2018) show that policy changes made 
between 1987 and 2014 played an important role in reducing income inequality, 
an important question for further research is which particular features of tax and 
social welfare policy help explain why growth was so broad-based and progressive, 
and to what extent these might be replicable in the coming years or elsewhere. 
 
A different picture, however, emerges in terms of market income inequality. While 
growth was – like that for disposable income – strong if volatile, it was also less 
broadly shared. We have seen that key measures of market income inequality 
declined over the 1990s, coinciding with a period of rapidly rising employment 
(especially among women). However, this decline in key measures of market 
income inequality across the population as a whole was reversed in the early 2000s 
with the Great Recession leading to a further rise. Although the recovery in the 
labour market since 2014 has meant that the main measures of market income 
inequality had almost regained their pre-crisis level by 2019, this is likely to be 
undone by the sharp falls in employment wrought by the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic. Research has shown that initial job losses were more heavily 
concentrated on lower-paid workers, particularly those working in areas like 




24  The only other OECD country to see a decline in the Gini coefficient of similar magnitude from the 1980s to 2010 was 
France. Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Portugal and South Korea also saw reductions, but smaller in magnitude or 
over a shorter horizon.  
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likely to have risen and will remain elevated until those who have lost work are 
able to return to their previous positions or find new ones.  
 
Chapter 3 showed that paid work also plays a crucial role in the determining the 
extent of very low living standards. Despite taking different paths over the late 
1990s and the course of the Great Recession, we saw that rates of both income 
poverty and material deprivation were significantly lower in 2019 than in 1994 for 
the population as a whole. However, measures of income poverty and material 
deprivation both point to the high incidence of low living standards among those 
in single adult households, particularly those with children. Higher rates of income 
poverty and material deprivation for lone parents and their children pre-date the 
Great Recession and have been an enduring feature of Irish society since at least 
the early 1990s. While the product of a multitude of factors (e.g. low hours and 
hourly wages among those from these groups in paid work), such high rates of 
poverty and deprivation in part reflect very low rates of employment among lone 
parents which Roantree (2020b) shows were – at 36 per cent in 2017 – the lowest 
in the European Union. Russell et al. (2018) find evidence to suggest that this is at 
least partly related to the cost of childcare, with mothers facing higher costs 
working fewer hours than those facing lower costs.  
 
Low rates of employment are also closely related to the risk of poverty and 
deprivation in other working-age households. Despite making up only 11 per cent 
of the population in 2019, those aged under 65 living in a household without 
anyone in paid work make up more than half of those below the poverty line and 
a third of those living in material deprivation. Not only do relatively few households 
in poverty or deprivation contain someone in paid work, but as Maître et al. (2017) 
show, less than a fifth of minimum wage workers belong to a household at risk of 
poverty. An important implication of this – as Redmond (2020), the Low Pay 
Commission (2018) and Logue and Callan (2016), among others, have argued – is 
that the minimum wage is a blunt instrument for addressing concerns around low 
living standards, poverty or deprivation in Ireland. Instead, the minimum wage 
might be better seen as a complement to social welfare policy, perhaps as a way 
of counteracting other forces acting to increase earnings inequality (Holton and 
O’Neill, 2017), reduce the gender pay gap (Bargain et al., 2018) or – as suggested 
by Joyce and Zilliak (2020) – limiting the extent to which employers with market 
power are able to capture gains from in-work transfers like the Working Families 
Payment. 
 
However, the patterns of poverty and deprivation highlighted in this report suggest 
that the social welfare system remains a powerful tool for those seeking to address 
high rates among lone parents and those living in households without a paid 
worker. This power is well illustrated by the experience of older adults. Chapter 3 
showed that income poverty rose rapidly among this group when increases to the 
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State pension lagged behind median income growth in the 1990s and fell sharply 
when increases exceeded median income growth in the 2000s. Similarly, the 
protection of the State pension in both real and nominal terms over the course of 
the Great Recession helped to mitigate the significant increases in material 
deprivation seen for other age groups.  
 
The unequal labour market impact of the Great Recession and ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic between generations was the topic considered in Chapter 4 of this 
report. We saw that young adults have been hardest hit by job losses in 2020, in 
part as more worked in sectors like hospitality, arts and leisure that were most 
exposed to the lockdowns required to suppress the spread of the virus. While 
concerning in and of itself, such patterns of job losses are likely to compound the 
still lingering effects of the Great Recession, which have left not in employment, 
education or training (NEET) rates for 20-24 year olds almost a third higher on the 
eve of the pandemic than they were in 2007. We also saw early evidence consistent 
with (and suggestive of) ‘scarring’ effects on the earnings of those born in the 
1990s. On top of this, home ownership rates for young adults have collapsed, 
leaving them more exposed to rapidly rising rents, particularly in the urban areas 
they are more likely to live in. The combined effect of these developments is to 
cast a pall over the prospects of young adults and should be a cause of serious 
concern for society at large.  
 
One area where policy can help is ensuring the provision of high-quality active 
labour market programmes with sufficient capacity to cater for the numbers that 
will need them in the years ahead. Research suggests that – unlike public sector 
employment programmes – both human capital training and ‘work first’ style 
programmes are effective at increasing the employment rates of participants in the 
medium-to-long run (Card et al., 2018). Although some of these types of 
programmes are operative in Ireland, a large share of the activation budget is spent 
on programmes which research has shown to be ineffective at increasing 
employment (e.g. Kelly et al., 2015). In addition, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 
(2020), the International Monetary Fund (2017) and the chair of the government’s 
own Labour Market Skills Council (Martin, 2020) – among others – have highlighted 
the need to significantly increase the number of caseworkers in the public 
employment services to bring client-caseworker ratios nearer the international 
best practice level of 100-150 per caseworker. Doing so is likely to require 
significantly increasing government expenditure on labour market activation 
measures, above and beyond the relatively modest increase of €210 million 
announced to date (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, 2020, Box E).  
 
Policies that act to tackle the root causes of high rents will also disproportionately 
benefit those younger adults who risk otherwise being left behind, given their 
relative exposure to the private rental market where affordability issues are most 
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acute (O’Toole et al., 2020; Corrigan et al., 2019). Foremost among these are 
policies that increase the supply of housing, such as the taxation of vacant or 
underdeveloped land (Morgenroth, 2016; Morley et al., 2015). While Corrigan et 
al. (2020) find evidence that policies aimed at addressing credit constraints may 
have some merit, O’Toole and Slaymaker (2021) caution that in that context of 
supply shortages such schemes are likely to lead to higher prices and exacerbate 
affordability problems in the future.  
 
However, increasing housing supply significantly will take time, and there may be 
a case in the interim for examining whether the current of system of housing 
supports for low-income renters is adequate. Limits on the rent that can be paid 
for a property covered by Housing Assistance Payment were last revised in March 
2017 and those for Rent Supplement in July 2016, since when rents have risen 
nationally by 25 per cent and 28 per cent respectively (RTB, 2020). Reports from 
the Citizens Information Board (2017) and Simon Community (2021) have shown 
that these limits cover only a small number of properties available for rent on the 
private market, particularly for single adults and lone parents. 
 
Along with young adults, this report has shown that these groups were at risk of 
being excluded from the growth in material living standards enjoyed by the wider 
population, even before the outbreak of the pandemic. Future research – including 
subsequent editions of this report – will seek to further our understanding of why 
these groups are at such risk and what options exist for policymakers seeking to 
address the consistently higher rates of poverty and deprivation they face. 
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APPENDIX A  
Data and methodology 
This appendix provides additional details on the data sources used in this paper as 
well as the methodology used to derive indicators of poverty, deprivation, and 
income inequality measures.  
A.1 DATA SOURCES 
The Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services  
The Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services was carried 
out by the Survey Unit of the ESRI in 1987 with the support of the European 
Commission and the Combat Poverty Agency. Results were first published in Callan 
et al. (1988), which reports that 3,286 households responded out of a valid sample 
of 5,155: an effective response rate of 63.7 per cent. These households contained 
just under 8,200 adults, each of whom was interviewed individually about their 
income sources and experience of the labour market. Weights were derived to 
correct for the greater likelihood of larger households being sampled (a product of 
the sampling frame being based on the electoral register and so households with 
more voters being more likely to be selected for inclusion) and a slight over-
representation of older and rural heads of households. Analysis was carried out on 
the anonymised survey microdata files held by the ESRI on its secure server.  
Living in Ireland Survey  
The Living in Ireland Survey was also carried out by the Survey Unit of the ESRI 
beginning in 1994, again with the support of the European Commission. Each adult 
in a household completed an individual questionnaire through a face-to-face 
interview, with a similar initial sampling frame to the 1987 Survey. However, in 
keeping with the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) of which it was 
part, the survey adopted a longitudinal design with household members followed 
up in subsequent waves of the survey. By Wave 7 (2000), attrition was deemed to 
be a cause of concern and the original sample of individuals still in scope of the 
survey (i.e. who had not died, moved to an institution or outside of the EU) were 
supplemented with a booster sample selected using a similar procedure as for the 
first wave of the survey. Weights were derived to correct for attrition and biases in 
the distribution of observed characteristics compared to the population of interest. 
There was an influx of more than 1,500 new individuals into the survey as 
compared to 5,530 from the original sample. However, to avoid any potential 
concerns about the representativeness of these later waves, we use only 
Waves 1-6 of the Living in Ireland Survey spanning the years 1994-1999, with 
analysis again carried out on the anonymised survey microdata files held by the 
ESRI on its secure server. 
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Survey of income and Living Conditions  
The Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) is an annual survey of 
households carried out by the Central Statistics Office since 2003. Like the Living in 
Ireland Survey, it was initiated with the aim of collecting harmonised information 
on households for all countries in the European Union. However, unlike the Living 
in Ireland survey, it is not primarily a longitudinal survey with the vast majority of 
respondents sampled anew each year.25 For the most part, we use the anonymised 
Researcher Microdata File data made available by the CSO to researchers through 
a secure virtual desktop infrastructure. Chapter 4 also makes use of the Eurostat 
User Database version of the data which contains a more limited set of variables.  
Labour Force Survey  
Chapter 4 also makes use of the anonymised Researcher Microdata File for the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), a large-scale, nationwide survey of households in 
Ireland designed to produce official estimates of employment and unemployment. 
This replaced the Quarterly National Household Survey in 2017, which had 
provided such information since 1998. Although it comprises of a much larger 
sample than the other surveys used in this report (c.25,000 – 35,000 households), 
it does not include information on household incomes or earnings. 
A.2 INCOME CONCEPTS AND COMPARISONS  
Market income 
Our measure of market income includes employee cash or near cash income, cash 
benefits or losses from self-employment, income from land or property rental, 
regular inter-household cash transfers received, interest, dividends, and profit 
from capital investments in unincorporated business. We exclude income from 
private pensions from our measure as occupational pension income is combined 
with that from the State pension in SILC. While it would be preferable to include 
all forms of pension income, the shift over time towards personal pension plans 
and away from occupational pensions risks biasing our results over time. We 
truncate our measure of market income at zero so that negative values (e.g. large 
losses from self-employment) are counted as zero.  
Disposable income 
Our definition of disposable income corresponds to that used by Eurostat for the 
purposes of SILC (Eurostat, 2018) with the exclusion of the imputed value of a 
company car – which is available only in the SILC data from 2007 – and net 
contributions to individual private pension plans (which represent deferred income 
and should be treated in a manner consistent with those to – predominantly public 




25  A small number of households are included in a panel element: see CSO (2017, pp.7-9). 
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market income (described above), adds pension and social welfare income and 
deducts taxes on income, social insurance contributions regular taxes on wealth 
and regular inter-household cash transfers.  
Comparing income across households 
Our measures of market and disposable income are aggregated to the level of the 
household before being adjusted for household size and composition (as discussed 
below). This implicitly makes an assumption of perfect income sharing within 
households. While appropriate for many households (e.g. a couple who both 
benefit from additional income in the household), it may be less so for others (e.g. 
students or young workers sharing a house). However, like Bourquin et al. (2020) 
we regard perfect income sharing as the most transparent and least arbitrary 
assumption given the data available.  
 
As described in the main text, our measures of market and disposable income are 
adjusted for household size and composition using the modified OECD equivalence 
scale. This is to account for the fact that two households with the same level of 
disposable income, but different composition will typically experience different 
standards of living. For example, a household income of €50,000 will – ceteris 
paribus – deliver a much higher standard of living to a single adult than a couple 
with two children. Equivalising incomes with the modified OECD scale is not the 
only approach one could take. For example, the CSO uses a ‘national’ equivalence 
scale that (as shown in Table A.1) gives greater weight to second or subsequent 
adults and children aged 14 plus, while there are likely characteristics other than 
age and the number of individuals that affect a households’ needs. Nevertheless, 
some method is needed for comparing incomes across different household types, 
and the approach we adopt allows us to produce estimates which can be compared 
to other European countries, the United States (Joyce and Ziliak, 2020) and Britain 
(Bourquin et al., 2020).  
 
TABLE A.1 EQUIVALENCE SCALES  
 Modified OECD scale CSO national scale  
First adult 1 1 
Second or subsequent adults 0.5 0.66 
Child aged 14 plus 0.5 0.66 
Child age under 14 0.3 0.33 
 
  
Although we aggregate income to the household level, our unit of analysis 
throughout is the individual. That is, we assign each individual in a household the 
equivalised income of their household, consistent with our assumption of perfect 
income sharing.  
Adjusting for inflation  
All monetary amounts are converted to 2019 prices using the CSO’s all-item 
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monthly Consumer Price Index (CPM02). All growth rates in these monetary 
variables are calculated after accounting for inflation. 
A.3  THE MEASUREMENT OF MATERIAL DEPRIVATION IN IRELAND 
The Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services was the 
first survey in Ireland to collect a wide range of information about household and 
individuals’ possession of items and activities; and whether they considered those 
as essentials, and in their absence if that was because they could not afford them. 
The follow up survey, the Living in Ireland Survey that was conducted by the ESRI 
between 1994 to 2001, included 23 non-monetary indicators capturing enforced 
deprivation due to lack of resources. Using factor analysis techniques, Callan et al. 
(1993) and later Nolan and Whelan (1996) identified several dimensions of 
deprivation (basic life-style, secondary life-style, housing deprivation). The basic 
life-style dimension (labelled basic dimension) included eight items from not being 
able to afford new clothes, to having a meal with meat, fish or chicken every second 
day. This basic deprivation indicator was used to monitor deprivation in Ireland and 
people were considered to experience deprivation when they lacked one or more 
of the eight items. The measure of basic deprivation was also combined with the 
at risk of poverty measure to create a measure of consistent poverty – identifying 
people both at risk of income poverty and deprivation – which was officially 
adopted in 1997 by the Irish government in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy 
(Government of Ireland, 1997).  
 
As living standards rose rapidly during the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was 
some concern that the eight-item basic deprivation measure was no longer able to 
capture poverty and social exclusion. Maître et al. (2006) used the release of the 
SILC survey to re-examine the dimensions of deprivation and derived a new 
measure of deprivation. Some items of the original eight were dropped and 
replaced by new items, including items about social interactions. The revised 
indicator of basic deprivation was in time extended to include 11 items, with 
people classified as being in material deprivation if they lack two or more items. Of 
the 11 items collected in SILC, ten are available in the LIIS. We use these to 
construct a consistent measure of deprivation across the surveys, with individuals 
classified as deprived if they are lacking two of the ten items.  
 
In the first release of the 2003 SILC results, the Central Statistics Office (2005) noted 
deprivation rates were about 3 to 5 percentage points higher than those observed 
in the final wave of the LIIS (2001) and highlighted two factors that could explain 
these differences. The first was that SILC adopted Computer Assisted Personal 
Interviewing, whereas the LIIS did not. The second possible explanation related to 
the longitudinal nature of the LIIS – with the associated issues of attrition discussed 
above – while the 2003 SILC sample was comprised entirely of households 
interviewed for the first time. 
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APPENDIX B  
Additional tables and figures 
 
TABLE B.1  SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES OF DISPOSABLE INCOME INEQUALITY 
 Gini 90-10 90-50 75-25 50-10 GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) 
1987 0.333 4.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 0.319 0.193 0.202 0.302 
          
1994 0.315 4.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 0.170 0.161 0.179 0.219 
1995 0.320 4.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 0.176 0.170 0.213 0.232 
1996 0.328 4.2 2.1 2.3 2.0 0.193 0.178 0.212 0.291 
1997 0.316 4.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 0.176 0.168 0.217 0.252 
1998 0.312 4.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 0.172 0.162 0.197 0.246 
1999 0.297 4.2 1.9 2.2 2.2 0.147 0.150 0.200 0.175 
          
2003 0.309 4.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 0.163 0.167 0.265 0.229 
2004 0.313 3.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 0.182 0.168 0.225 0.284 
2005 0.317 3.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 0.202 0.172 0.207 0.399 
2006 0.321 3.8 2.0 2.1 1.9 0.201 0.170 0.197 0.420 
2007 0.314 3.8 1.9 2.1 1.9 0.181 0.167 0.239 0.315 
2008 0.304 3.6 1.9 2.0 1.9 0.169 0.155 0.213 0.319 
2009 0.284 3.4 1.8 2.0 1.9 0.141 0.140 0.339 0.181 
2010 0.305 3.6 2.0 2.0 1.8 0.165 0.161 0.271 0.235 
2011 0.296 3.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 0.150 0.158 0.295 0.184 
2012 0.302 3.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.158 0.162 0.357 0.209 
2013 0.305 3.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 0.164 0.163 0.245 0.234 
2014 0.308 3.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 0.164 0.164 0.262 0.225 
2015 0.296 3.6 1.9 2.0 1.9 0.150 0.149 0.228 0.197 
2016 0.296 3.6 1.9 2.0 1.9 0.159 0.154 0.374 0.233 
2017 0.303 3.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 0.169 0.159 0.236 0.279 
2018 0.286 3.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 0.163 0.142 0.234 0.330 
2019 0.280 3.2 1.8 1.9 1.8 0.151 0.132 0.146 0.240 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland Survey 
and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Note: Incomes after direct taxes paid and benefits received. Columns entitled GE(a) show estimates of the Generalised Entropy class of 
inequality measures, where a=-1,0,1 exclude a small number of observations with non-positive values for disposable income.  
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TABLE B.2  DECILE SHARES OF DISPOSABLE INCOME  



















1987 3.1 4.7 5.5 6.6 7.5 8.8 10.3 12.3 15.2 25.9 
           
1994 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.5 7.7 9.1 10.8 12.7 15.4 24.0 
1995 3.5 4.6 5.4 6.5 7.7 9.1 10.7 12.6 15.6 24.2 
1996 3.5 4.6 5.5 6.5 7.4 8.9 10.5 12.6 15.4 25.2 
1997 3.4 4.7 5.5 6.6 7.8 9.2 11.0 12.3 15.5 23.9 
1998 3.4 4.6 5.7 6.8 8.1 9.2 10.6 12.4 15.0 24.1 
1999 3.4 4.7 5.8 7.1 8.4 9.5 11.0 12.7 15.2 22.3 
           
2003 2.8 4.8 6.0 7.0 8.2 9.7 10.8 12.3 15.0 23.4 
2004 3.3 4.7 5.7 6.9 8.1 9.3 10.7 12.4 14.7 24.3 
2005 3.3 4.7 5.7 6.8 8.0 9.2 10.6 12.2 14.5 25.0 
2006 3.2 4.8 5.7 6.8 7.9 9.0 10.5 12.1 14.6 25.3 
2007 3.2 4.9 5.8 6.8 7.9 9.2 10.8 12.5 14.7 24.3 
2008 3.1 5.1 6.1 7.0 8.1 9.4 10.4 12.4 14.6 23.9 
2009 3.6 5.3 6.2 7.1 8.2 9.4 10.7 12.5 14.5 22.4 
2010 3.2 5.2 6.1 7.0 8.0 9.2 10.5 12.1 15.1 23.9 
2011 3.1 5.2 6.2 7.1 8.1 9.4 10.6 12.3 15.0 23.0 
2012 3.1 5.0 6.2 7.1 8.1 9.3 10.6 12.5 14.9 23.3 
2013 3.1 5.1 6.0 6.9 8.0 9.3 10.5 12.4 14.9 23.7 
2014 3.0 5.0 6.1 7.0 8.0 9.5 10.2 12.4 15.0 23.9 
2015 3.4 5.1 6.1 7.0 8.1 9.3 10.6 12.4 15.0 23.1 
2016 3.4 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.4 10.6 12.2 14.6 23.4 
2017 3.5 5.1 6.0 6.9 7.9 9.1 10.6 12.1 14.9 24.0 
2018 3.7 5.3 6.2 7.3 8.2 9.3 10.3 12.1 14.3 23.3 
2019 4.0 5.4 6.3 7.2 8.1 9.2 10.4 12.0 14.1 23.2 
    
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland 
Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
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TABLE B.3  SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES OF MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY 
 Gini 90-10 90-50 75-25 50-10 GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) 
1987 0.522 19.5 2.5 3.2 7.7 0.360 0.588 27.231 0.591 
          
1994 0.534 15.6 2.4 3.1 6.5 0.306 0.499 10,355.800 0.543 
1995 0.531 13.3 2.4 3.1 5.5 0.307 0.491 2,256.663 0.555 
1996 0.533 13.2 2.4 3.3 5.4 0.339 0.534 2,459.659 0.628 
1997 0.519 11.5 2.4 2.9 4.8 0.310 0.507 338.426 0.559 
1998 0.496 11.8 2.3 2.8 5.2 0.297 0.472 13.664 0.503 
1999 0.469 7.4 2.1 2.4 3.5 0.252 0.416 14.004 0.433 
          
2003 0.473 9.7 2.3 2.7 4.3 0.268 0.399 10.948 0.441 
2004 0.501 8.9 2.2 2.8 4.0 0.326 0.414 25.855 0.743 
2005 0.515 10.1 2.3 2.8 4.4 0.342 0.401 2.310 0.821 
2006 0.512 10.7 2.3 3.0 4.6 0.346 0.421 2.580 0.815 
2007 0.516 13.2 2.4 3.4 5.4 0.358 0.459 3.855 0.716 
2008 0.515 11.8 2.4 3.3 5.0 0.340 0.430 3.302 0.632 
2009 0.538 11.7 2.4 3.4 4.9 0.322 0.436 4.400 0.595 
2010 0.595 15.9 2.6 3.7 6.1 0.394 0.551 14.399 0.868 
2011 0.584 16.0 2.7 4.1 6.0 0.369 0.522 12.318 0.712 
2012 0.574 17.4 2.6 3.9 6.6 0.351 0.530 11.702 0.653 
2013 0.586 19.4 2.7 4.0 7.2 0.382 0.564 32.559 0.776 
2014 0.580 16.1 2.7 4.0 5.9 0.379 0.544 18.804 0.757 
2015 0.555 15.8 2.5 3.6 6.2 0.349 0.509 18.613 0.652 
2016 0.549 12.4 2.4 3.5 5.1 0.355 0.488 8.662 0.704 
2017 0.547 14.6 2.6 3.5 5.5 0.377 0.513 12.394 0.780 
2018 0.537 12.5 2.4 3.1 5.3 0.405 0.519 31.555 1.095 
2019 0.521 11.1 2.4 3.1 4.7 0.355 0.470 89.601 0.746 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland Survey 
and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Notes: Incomes before direct taxes paid and benefits received, excluding pension income. Columns entitled GE(a) show estimates of the 
Generalised Entropy class of inequality measures. All measures except the Gini and GE(2) exclude a significant number of 
observations with non-positive values.  
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TABLE B.4  DECILE SHARES OF MARKET INCOME  



















1987 0.0 0.2 2.1 4.7 6.9 8.9 11.1 13.9 18.7 33.5 
           
1994 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.2 6.8 9.2 11.8 15.0 19.6 32.4 
1995 0.0 0.0 1.3 4.4 6.7 9.1 11.8 14.8 19.4 32.5 
1996 0.0 0.0 1.6 4.2 6.6 9.1 11.4 14.6 19.4 33.1 
1997 0.0 0.0 1.8 4.7 7.0 9.1 11.4 14.5 19.2 32.2 
1998 0.0 0.2 2.6 5.3 7.4 9.1 11.6 14.2 18.4 31.1 
1999 0.0 0.2 3.1 6.0 7.8 9.9 11.8 14.3 17.8 29.1 
           
2003 0.0 0.4 3.2 5.7 7.7 9.6 11.7 14.0 18.2 29.6 
2004 0.0 0.2 2.7 5.2 7.2 9.3 11.3 13.8 17.7 32.4 
2005 0.0 0.2 2.4 4.9 7.0 9.1 11.3 13.9 17.8 33.4 
2006 0.0 0.3 2.4 4.9 6.9 9.0 11.3 14.1 18.0 33.0 
2007 0.0 0.4 2.3 4.6 6.7 8.8 11.3 14.4 18.4 32.9 
2008 0.0 0.4 2.5 4.6 6.8 9.0 11.3 14.1 18.3 33.1 
2009 0.0 0.0 1.5 4.1 6.2 8.9 11.8 15.0 19.4 33.1 
2010 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.6 5.2 7.9 11.1 14.8 20.3 37.6 
2011 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.8 5.2 8.1 11.4 15.1 20.6 36.4 
2012 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.9 5.5 8.2 11.7 15.4 20.8 35.0 
2013 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.6 5.3 8.2 11.5 15.1 20.5 36.4 
2014 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.0 5.7 7.8 11.2 14.9 20.4 36.4 
2015 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.5 6.2 8.5 11.5 14.9 20.0 34.4 
2016 0.0 0.0 1.4 3.9 6.3 8.7 11.3 14.5 19.1 34.9 
2017 0.0 0.1 1.7 4.1 6.2 8.5 10.9 14.2 19.0 35.3 
2018 0.0 0.1 2.1 4.4 6.6 8.9 11.0 13.5 17.9 35.5 
2019 0.0 0.2 2.4 4.6 6.9 8.8 11.2 13.9 18.3 33.7 
    
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, the Living in Ireland Survey 
and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files. 
Note: Incomes before direct taxes paid and benefits received, excluding pension income.  
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FIGURE B.1  CHANGE IN REAL MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS, BY AGE 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Survey of Income and Living Conditions Research Microdata Files (SILC RMF). 
Note: Median weekly earnings deflated by the CPI and expressed relative to their 2009 level.  
 
FIGURE B.2  EMPLOYMENT RATES, BY AGE 
DRAFT 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Labour Force Survey Research Microdata Files (LFS RMF). 
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